

Lexicographical Notes on Alexander of Aphrodisias' Philosophical Terminology¹⁾

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In its entry for *πρόσκρισις* our major lexicon²⁾ reports that it is used in the sense of "assimilation" with *τροφή* by Michael of Ephesus (*Nic.Eth.* 52.14), the eleventh century Byzantine commentator. Yet the index to the second part of Volume Two of the *Supplementum Aristotelicum* shows that the word is used in just this sense by the commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (*de mixt.* 235.22) who flourished some eight hundred years earlier.³⁾ Again the lexicon records no instance of *πρόσκριτικός*, but the same author used this word also in the *de mixtione* at 234.14, an instance which in this case the index does not record. These two examples serve to illustrate our lexicon's neglect of Alexander of Aphrodisias, while further indicating the care that must be taken in utilising the indices to his works for lexicographical purposes. Both points need to be made strongly in view of Sir Henry Stuart Jones's preface of 1925 to the lexicon which reported that notes on the vocabulary of the Aristotelian commentators would be supplied "with the aid of the excellent indices of the Berlin edition" (p. ix). For although some notes must have been supplied (v. note 30), a highly selective use is made of the material available from the commentators, as this note will show for the particular case of Alexander,⁴⁾ while

¹⁾ Since the Greek commentators are extensively discussed I shall refer to their works by the abbreviated title of the relevant Aristotelian work, and the page and line number of the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (Berlin 1883–1907). The minor works of Alexander of Aphrodisias are cited from Vols. I and II of the *Supplementum Aristotelicum*, ed. I Bruns (Berlin 1887, 1892).

²⁾ Hereafter I shall refer to *A Greek-English Lexicon*, compiled by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, revised by H. Stuart Jones (9th ed.; Oxford 1940, with a supplement, 1968) simply as "the lexicon".

³⁾ This is not to mention the indices to Alex. *de sensu* (citing 78.8 and 109.14), *Meteor.* (for 72.25) and *Met.* (for 310.12), or the index to Philoponus (fl. 520 A. D.) *de gen. et corr.* (for 113.18, 117.20) where similar usage occurs.

⁴⁾ With regard to other commentators I would particularly note the example of the verb *ἀντενεργεῖν* which is used by Philoponus (*de an.* 334.18, 20, 25) to describe the action of a body in passing on the *ἐνέργεια* or activity of light. The relevant index records these usages but they are not in the lexicon (v. further S. Sambursky, "Philoponus's Theory of Light", *Osiris*, XIII [1958] at p. 119 – to which I owe this point – on the underlying physical theory).

Jones's optimism ignores the warnings issued by Karl Praechter some eighteen years earlier in a review of most the volumes of the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* about the quality of their indices.⁵⁾

Here I shall confine myself to examining Alexander of Aphrodisias' use of two groups of words. The first is a set of non-Aristotleian epistemological terms that he uses to describe various concepts in Aristotle's theory of knowledge; and the second a group of terms, partly borrowed and partly developed by himself, that are employed to describe major metaphysical concepts in the Aristotelian system: substance, form, matter, and potentiality. In each of these cases the lexicon entry is deficient. This is unfortunate since although much of the vocabulary of the Greek commentators is necessarily parasitic on that of the author they are discussing, it is important to acknowledge occasions on which this pattern is broken. In particular is this necessary in the case of as relatively early an author as Alexander of Aphrodisias who drew on a well-established philosophical tradition.⁶⁾ The words I shall discuss are for the most part sufficiently familiar for the indices to have recorded a large number of instances, and in only one case are they entirely silent. By examining contexts as thoroughly as possible I have tried to offset any residual deficiencies that they may possess. Although I shall concentrate here on Alexander of Aphrodisias my account could in a very large measure be extended to the vocabulary of the later commentators who in this, as in other areas, were greatly in Alexander's debt. I shall therefore also include some evidence of their usage.

I. Some Epistemological Terms

ἀντίληψις, ἀντίληπτικός. In the sense of a sensory or epistemic apprehension of objects these terms are not used before the Stoics and Epicureans, though the evidence is not sufficient for their usage to be termed technical.⁷⁾ For Alexander the lexicon only records

⁵⁾ *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 18 (1909) at pp. 518–519.

⁶⁾ Although only the commentary of Aspasius (c. 100 A. D.) on the *Nicomachean Ethics* is extant (*Commentaria*, XIX–i) it is a reasonable assumption that Alexander's vocabulary was influenced by that of earlier second century commentators such as Adrastus, Herminus, or Sosigines.

⁷⁾ This is because they only occur in testimonia of authors who may be influenced by the general usage of the term that, as we shall see, is reflected

ἀντίληψις at *Top.* 91.5, and *ἀντιληπτός* τῇ ἀφῇ at *Met.* 201.4. This does not bring out the extent to which this language served as a blanket terminology to describe the relation of all senses to their sense-objects. This can best be illustrated from Alexander's essay, the *de anima*, e.g. ἡ καθ' ἐκάστην αὐτῶν [sc. τῶν αἰσθήσεων] τοῦ οἰκείου αἰσθητοῦ ἀντίληψις (60.2) and ἡ δὲ γευστικὴ αἰσθησίς τε καὶ δυνάμις ἐστὶ μὲν ἀντιληπτικὴ τε καὶ κριτικὴ τῶν γευστῶν (53.30–54.1). Despite its naturally very frequent use in this essay⁸) this term is—quite incredibly—not recorded in the relevant index, and for this reason the lexicon could only note the instances recorded by the more vigilant editors of the commentaries on the *Topics* and *Metaphysics*. Even so *Top.* 343.11—where *ἀντίληψις* is said to be the γένος of αἰσθησίς, which explains its usage elsewhere—perhaps deserved note. The indices to the commentaries on the *Meteorologica*, and especially the *de sensu*, are more adequate and confirm that this terminology described in the most general terms the relation between senses and their objects. Though κρίσις or κριτικός are used with it (*de an.* 55.13, 60.2–3, *de sensu* 166.3) it seems clear that *ἀντίληψις* etcetera described the same relation, and such expressions are merely tautologous. When Aristotle described each sense as infallibly judging its special objects (ἐκάστη γε κρίνει περὶ τούτων καὶ οὐκ ἀπατάται *de an.* 418a. 14–15) he meant what Alexander conveyed by *ἀντίληψις* or *ἀντιληπτικός* αἰσθησίς.

κατάληψις, καταληπτικός, συγκατάθεσις. The Stoic origins of these terms are well known. The criterion of truth for them was the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία (e.g. Diog. Laert. VII. 54), a self-guaranteeing presentation to which assent (συγκατάθεσις) could be given (v. Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* XI. 182). In his discussion of the very different Aristotelian concept of φαντασία⁹) (*de an.* 66.9–73.13) Alex-

in Alexander. So *ἀντιληπτικός* at Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* VII. 360 (= Von Arnim, *Sto. Vet. Frag.* II, p. 230.25–26). This author uses the term widely in a general sense unattached to any Stoic doctrine, just as the text quoted is itself a very general summary of a Stoic view.

⁸) E.g. 54.21; 55.1, 16; 55.16, 20, 24 (*ἀντίληψις*), and 55.13; 58.15; 61.27 (*ἀντιληπτικός*). Naturally those words are used widely in the commentary on the *de sensu* where the index records them fully. Sextus Empiricus employs both terms but in a looser sense since he lacks the Aristotelian framework within which Alexander works: e.g. we find both the typically Alexandrian *ἀντίληψις* τῶν χρωμάτων (*P.H.* I. 44) as well as ἀντ. τῶν ἀρετῶν (*P.H.* I. 95).

⁹) Briefly, it is a stage away from αἰσθησίς and therefore less likely to be true, whereas for the Stoics it can, qua καταληπτικὴ, be a guarantor of truth by establishing perception on a firmer basis.

ander employs this language somewhat illegitimately for his own purposes. He distinguishes vivid and true *φαντασίαι* from the vague and false by the former being *καταληπτικάί*, the latter *ἀκατάληπται* (*de an.* 71.11–12); *κατάληψις* then is defined as an assent, or *συγκατάθεσις* to clear and true perceptions (71.12).¹⁰ This complete neglect of the Stoic basis of this language furnished later commentators on the *de anima* a vocabulary of terminological variants which they employ in discussing Aristotle's concept of *φαντασία*.¹¹ Something of this vestigial usage could be recorded in the lexicon where it is at present entirely ignored. On *συγκατάθεσις* it does record Plotinus I. 8.14, where speaking of the evil soul he says *προπετῇ δὲ εἰς συγκαταθέσεις καὶ ταῖς ἀμυδραῖς φαντασίαις εἰκονσαν ῥαδίως*. But by citing it after the Stoic usages the lexicon implies that this is in some sense derived from the Stoics, whereas it could well have been based on Alexander,¹² *de an.* 71.10–13 *τὰς δὴ ἀληθεῖς τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ σφοδρὰς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν καὶ καταληπτικὰς τῷ κατάληψιν εἶναι τὴν ταῖς τοιαύταις φαντασίαις συγκατάθεσιν ἀκατάληπτον δὲ φαντασίαν καλοῦμεν τὴν τε ψευδῇ καὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰς ἀμυδράς*. Cf. also *ἀμυδραὶ φαντασίαι* at *de an.* 71.5.

ἐγκατάλειμμα. The lexicon records two senses: residue, and “residual trace, *εἰδῶλον*”. The latter epistemological usage at Epicurus *Ep. ad Hdt.* 50 is in fact, as the relevant index shows, quite frequent in Alexander's *de anima* meaning the residual trace of a perception: e.g. 63.2–4, *οἱ γοῦν τῶν σφόδρα λευκῶν αἰσθανόμενοι ἔχουσί τινα ἐγκαταλείμματα ἐν τῇ ὄψει τῆς ἀπ' αὐτῶν κινήσεως καίτοι μηκέτ' ἐκείνων παρόντων* (cf. *Met.* 433.5 and *Simplic. de an.* 202.32). The term takes on considerable philosophical interest when used in Alexander's account of *φαντασία* to mean the image or *τὸ φανταστόν* (*de an.* 68.26–27) on which *τὸ φανταστικόν*, the faculty of imagination, acts (*de an.* 68.28–30). On this basis he can distinguish his theory of *φαντασία* from that of the Stoics who define it *tout court* as *ἐγκατάλειμμα* (*de an.* 68.10–13), and therefore cannot distinguish it from the image produced by perception or from a memory-image (*de an.*

¹⁰) For *συγκατάθεσις* in this context v. *de an.* 71.12, 16, 22, 23; 72.13, 15, 22, 24; 73.1, 9, 10, 12; and cf. *de fato* 182.16 where, as at *de an.* 73.21, it is used in the context of a discussion of *ὁρμή*. *Aspasius Nic.Eth.* 45.2 (*γίνεται τινα πάθη ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φαντασίας χωρὶς συγκαταθέσεως καὶ ὑπολήψεως*) shows that Alexander was not the first Peripatetic to assimilate this Stoic term.

¹¹) E.g. v. *συγκατάθεσις* at *Philop. de an.* 489.1, *Simplic. de an.* 210.14, *Themist. de an.* 89.21.

¹²) He was used by Plotinus: v. Porphyry *Vit. Plot.* 14.

16–21).¹³) For ἐγκατάλειμμα is only the basis for the κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως (Aristotle's definition, cf. *de an.* 428b 13–14), and not, as the Stoics thought, the φαντασία itself (*de an.* 7.2–5).¹⁴) Thus we see what is almost certainly an Epicurean technical term,¹⁵) utilised by Alexander to introduce the idea of the image in φαντασία, a point on which Aristotle had wavered.¹⁶) This in effect both clarified Aristotle's account and refuted the alternative Stoic view. A few references in the lexicon could point the way to this fascinating construction of which I have only sketched the outline.

πρόληψις. I shall not discuss Alexander's use of this Stoic term along with the related terms κοινὰ ἔννοιαι and φυσικὰ ἔννοιαι, as it can only be understood against the background of an interpretation of the Stoic doctrine of common notions, of which they are in varying ways an expression. I have attempted this in an article forthcoming in *Symbolae Osloenses* (Vol. XLVIII), where I discuss the use of this terminology by Alexander and later commentators. Here I note that no part of this rich vein is conveyed by the lexicon. Such an account would have to respect the following categories.

- (1) general notions based on common sense, universally assented to: πρόληψις (e.g. *de fato* 165.15), κοινὴ πρόληψις (e.g. *de fato* 165.25), φυσικὴ ἔννοια (*de mixt.* 218.17), κοινὰ ἔννοιαι (*Met.* 9.26);
- (2) axioms, self-evident first-principles: φυσικὰ καὶ κοινὰ ἔννοιαι (e.g. *Met.* 317.34–35).

¹³) Philoponus however uses the term just to mean memory-image: v. *de an.* 158.15–20 (cf. Themistius *de an.* 28.17), and Simplicius (*Cat.* 255.9) to mean after-image. Themistius however (*de an.* 90.2, 93.20) does use the term in his paraphrase of Aristotle's discussion of φαντασία in the same fashion as Alexander.

¹⁴) Other uses in this context to mean the image in φαντασία at *de an.* 68.7, 27; 69.1, 2; 72.8.

¹⁵) -μα nouns in particular seem to have been favoured by the Epicureans: v. for example πίκνωμα (*Ep. ad Hdt.* 36, 50), ῥεῦμα (*ibid.* 52), ἄθροισμα and σύμπτωμα (*ibid.* 64). The habit continued: v. συναύξημα in what is almost certainly an Epicurean inscription at *I.G.*, II², 1097, line 20. On this v. J.H. Oliver, *TAPA*, 69 (1938), 494–499. Also cf. *I.G.*, II², 1099, for οἰκονόμημα in a letter of Plotina, Hadrian's mother, to Athenian Epicureans.

¹⁶) V. D.A. Rees in a recent article, "Aristotle's Treatment of φαντασία" in J.P. Anton and G.L. Kustas eds., *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy* (Albany 1971), pp. 491–504, especially at pp. 497–500, where the use of φαντασία to mean both mental image and proposition is clearly brought out.

That is, the same language expresses two quite different ideas, only the former corresponding to the sense that these terms bore in Stoic philosophy.

II. Some Metaphysical Terminology

εἶδος ἔνυλον. This expression is widely used by Alexander to describe the relation of form and matter as inseparable. As such it is particularly applied to the soul. It can be seen as an indication of what is often termed Alexander's nominalism.¹⁷⁾ It may well be derived from the one use of *ἔνυλος* by Aristotle at *de an.* 403a 25 (*τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἐνυλοί εἰσιν*) as Hicks¹⁸⁾ *ad loc.* suggests. For this reason in the lexicon some reference to Alexander¹⁹⁾ might be interposed between the citation of this text and references to such authors as Plotinus and Proclus, so that some picture of the historical development of the term's usage might be formed.

ἐπιδεκτικός. In the sense of "receptive" this is applied by Alexander to primary matter as the substrate receptive of the opposites of the primary bodies: e.g. *de an.* 5.8, and *de mixt.* 229.27–28 (*τῆς γὰρ ὕλης ἴδιον τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιδεκτικὴν*). This has no direct Aristotelian precedent.²⁰⁾ As such it would seem to deserve note equally, if not more so, than the lexicon's frankly eccentric reference to Ps.-Alex. *De Febribus* 25 which distinguishes *ἐπιδεκτικὸν αἷτιον* from *ποιητικόν*.

ἐπιτηδειότης. I shall be brief here since in an article forthcoming in *Acta Classica* (Vol. XV) I discuss this term in some detail. Derived from Philo the Megaric²¹⁾ where it means the capacity of a body to act or be affected, it is used by Alexander and later commentators to cover the same range of meanings conveyed by *δύναμις* in Aristotle. That is, it can mean a potentiality to be affected (e.g. *de sensu* 44.25–27, *de an.* 24–25), or a human capacity to learn (*de an.*

¹⁷⁾ V. C. Baeumker, *Das Problem der Materie in der Griechischen Philosophie* (1890, repr. Frankfurt 1963), pp. 296–297.

¹⁸⁾ Aristotle: *De Anima*, with translation, introduction and notes (Cambridge 1907, repr. Amsterdam 1965).

¹⁹⁾ Of which any of the following would be typical: *de an.* 16.2, *de mixt.* 222.35, or *Met.* 373.23–24 (*τὰ φυσικά καὶ ἔνυλα εἶδη, ὅποιον ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἢ ψυχῇ*).

²⁰⁾ But v. *de gen. et corr.* 320a.2–5 on which it may have been based.

²¹⁾ V. Alex. *Pr. An.* I. 184.6–10, and *Simplic. Cat.* 195.32–196.3.

84.14) or acquire virtue (*de fato* 198.5). Neither of these developments nor the Philonic origins of the term is reflected in the lexicon.

ὑπόστασις, ὑφεστάναι. The process by which Alexander took over this terminology from the Stoics has been traced by Dörrie.²²⁾ For lexicographical purposes we may note the following. Alexander does not use *ὑπόστασις* itself to mean a substance but rather employs the expressions *ἡ τοῦ—ὑπόστασις* or *ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν*.²³⁾ Thus we do not find the noun in the plural, and it can therefore carry the abstract meaning of “substantiality”. This is confirmed by its use in expressions such as *ἐν ὑποστάσει εἶναι* or *καθ' ὑπόστασιν εἶναι* to mean “having the character of a substance”; similarly the verb *ὑφεστάναι* is used with *καθ' αὐτά* or *κατ' ἰδίαν* in the same sense, and both expressions can be contrasted with theoretical existence, as conveyed by *ἐπινοία, κατ' ἐπινοίαν* or *λόγῳ ὑφεστάναι*.²⁴⁾ This pattern of usage is essentially a supplement to standard Aristotelian terminology, and like much of the vocabulary we have examined has no inherent philosophical significance. It is an example of terminological eclecticism controlled by the tenets of a philosophical system. Nevertheless it deserves some record in the lexicon.²⁵⁾

τελειότης. Aristotle uses this term rarely and in an entirely non-metaphysical sense to mean the attainment of its fullness by a magnitude (e.g. *Phys.* 207a 21, 261a 32–37), particularly through growth. Alexander's employment of the term can be gauged from his gloss on *Meteor.* Δ 379b 20, *ὅταν γὰρ πεφθῇ, τετελειωταί τε καὶ γέγονεν*. This is a metaphysically innocent description of the reconstitution of a body through coction, and like other uses of *τελει-*

²²⁾ „Υπόστασις, Wort- und Bedeutungsgeschichte“, *Nachr. der Akad. der Wiss., Göttingen*, Phil.-Hist. Kl. (1955), at pp. 59–60.

²³⁾ The indices are quite adequate, so I shall simply offer exemplifications here and in the next note: *de an.* 19.18–19 (*οὐ γὰρ δὴ γένος οἶον τε λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πνεῦμα, ἔχον ὑπόστασιν καθ' αὐτό* of *ibid.* 90.3–4 *εἰ γε ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ νοητοῦ εἶναι ὑπόστασις*). Cf. *Met.* 263.16.

²⁴⁾ *De mixt.* 228.23–24 (*οὔτε ἄλλαι τινὲς τῶν οὐσιῶν εἰσι μικταὶ παρὰ τὰς χωριστάς τε καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ὑφεστάναι δυναμένας . . .*); *Met.* 375.31–32 (*τὸ γὰρ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης ἕτερον καὶ χωριστόν, εἰ καὶ μὴ ὑποστάσει ἀλλὰ τῷ γε λόγῳ*) cf. *de sensu* 55.6–7 (*ἐν φαντασίᾳ* contrasted with *ἐν ὑποστάσει*); *Top.* 161.29–30 (*μὴ δύνασθαι γένος τι εἶναι ἐν ὑποστάσει μὴ εἶδους τινος ὄντος*) *Met.* 236.14 (*καθ' αὐτό ὑφεστάναι*).

²⁵⁾ Particularly in the reference to *κατ' ἰδίαν ὑφεστῶς* (under *ὑφίστημι* IV. 2) as *Aristot. fr.* 188. This is in fact *Alex. Met.* 84.28 and therefore Aristotelian only in a residual sense. Other references to Alexander in this context could clarify this.

οὐσθαι and τελείωσις in that book,²⁶⁾ simply describes the physical process of maturation. Yet Alexander writes (*Meteor.* 186.34–35) *τετελείωται τε καὶ ὁ ἦν δυνάμει τοῦτο ἐνεργεία γέγονεν*, and this transformation would seem to be the licence under which τελειότης is used to mean ἐνεργεία or ἐντελέχεια²⁷⁾ (from which it is etymologically such a small step), or be more generally used as an equivalent for εἶδος.²⁸⁾ It is again simply a terminological variant entirely compatible with Aristotelian ideas,²⁹⁾ but one worth recording in a lexicon.

The sample of Alexander of Aphrodisias' vocabulary presented here can be regarded primarily as material from which a lexicographer might select in attempting to refine several of the entries in our major lexicon.³⁰⁾ It can also be looked upon as a preliminary contribution to some other areas.

First, the study of this vocabulary is one measure of the phenomenon of scholastic originality, or the means by which a commen-

²⁶⁾ 379b 18 (τελείωσις = maturity), 380a 19. Contrast *de sensu* 125.15 where τελείωσις is used in the sense of γένεσις.

²⁷⁾ On this v. *Schol. in Aristot.* 358a 19 quoted by Bonitz, (*Index. Aristot.* 253b 43–44): *τὴν ἐντελέχειαν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπὶ τῆς τελειότητος ἀκούει*. This shows the integration of the term in Peripatetic usage, and it is common in Themistius and Simplicius in this sense.

²⁸⁾ This is well illustrated by *de an.* 16.4–10 in Alexander's paraphrase of Aristotle's definition of the soul: . . . τὸ δὲ εἶδος, οὗ ἐστὶν εἶδος, ἐδείχθη καὶ τελειότης ὅν, ἔθος δὲ Ἀριστοτέλει τὴν τελειότητα καὶ ἐντελέχειαν λέγειν [cf. preceding note], ὡς τοῦ ἐν τῷ τέλει εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἐστὶν οὕσαν αἰτίαν, εἰκότως αὐτῆς ἀπέδωκε τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον· ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη. V. also *de an.* 7.7–8 (. . . τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν τελειότητα), with which cf. *Met.* 347.17–18; or *de an.* 43.7–8 (ἐστὶ γὰρ φῶς ἐνεργεία καὶ τελειότης τοῦ διαφανοῦς καθὼς τοιοῦτον) where it supplements the normal Aristotelian term. τελειότης occurs frequently in Alexander's note on *Met.* 994a 26 (at *Met.* 154.14–156.22), where Aristotle describes change as ἐκ τοῦ γινομένου τὸ γεγονὸς ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτελουμένου τὸ τετελεσμένον. It is clear that it is simply a gloss on the latter expression.

²⁹⁾ In this sense it does not seem to be influenced by Aristotelian uses of τέλειος, τελείωσις and τελειοῦσθαι in a moral sense (e.g. *τελειοτάτη ἀρετή* at 1098a 17). Cases where Alexander uses τελειότης to mean "perfection" (e.g. *Met.* 1.2, *ἡ γνῶσις τελειότης ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς*) or the achievement of a goal, in a loose ethical sense, without any metaphysical implications, paraphrase teleological thought in Aristotle, and are quite distinct from τελειότης qua ἐντελέχεια etc.

³⁰⁾ Actually a paradigm of what I would expect is given by the lexicon for the relatively unimportant though rare word ἀποκλήρωσις, where Alex. *de an.* 22.25 is cited; or again in its entry for ἀντιπροσκήνω. Why could there not have been the same treatment for philosophically important words?

tator makes his individual contribution to exegesis. In some cases this can be trivial and simply an indication of his awareness of a philosophically harmless jargon; but in others, as we saw particularly in discussing *ἐγκατάλειμμα*, new terminology can be the expression of an original interpretation.

Secondly, by studying this author's vocabulary in relation to the philosophical vocabulary of his contemporaries, such as Sextus Empiricus and Clement of Alexandria, as well as to the language of the later commentators, we can see the outlines of a philosophical lingua franca which transcended doctrinal affiliation. In the course of this article I have given only a few indications of the extent to which the vocabulary of Alexander that I have reviewed is paralleled elsewhere, and the subject needs further exploration. But it can be easily established that several of the terms examined here are used by both Sextus and Clement and in broadly similar senses.³¹⁾ Now Alexander himself is of overriding interest since he employs this vocabulary in the context of a systematic philosophy, the original texts of which can serve as a check and guide to his usage. But it is clear that similar vocabulary could be used for different but generally related philosophical purposes. This suggests that it was part of a common deposit from which Alexander among others could draw. The existence of this terminological *koiné* soon becomes obvious to anyone working in this area, and particularly, I imagine, to patristics scholars, but I have not discovered any attempts to describe it comprehensively.³²⁾ For the moment I hope only to have shown that our major Greek lexicon offers little indication of the extensive material in one of the authors whose works embody it.

³¹⁾ *ἐγκατάλειμμα* and *ἐπιδεκτικός* in the senses examined here, and *ἐνυλον εἶδος* are, as might be expected, restricted to Alexander and the Aristotelian commentators. The excellent indices of Janacek (Vol. IV of the Teubner ed. [Leipzig 1962]) and Stählin (Vol. III of his edition in the series *Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller*, Leipzig 1936) make unnecessary any detailed illustration of the usages of Sextus and Clement respectively. Suffice it to say that broadly speaking the sceptic is more consistent than the Christian father who adapts these terms to a wide variety of purposes.

³²⁾ This would require investigation in particular into the origins of technical terminology in Hellenistic philosophy. Here it certainly emerged as the result first of a generally increasing scholasticism; then the particular emphasis that both Stoics and Epicureans (cf. n. 15 above) placed on technical terms; and finally the development of scepticism, and the related phenomenon of eclecticism, which required a philosophical vocabulary capable of generalising the views of different schools.